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Defense (DoD).  This study employs panel data provided by 
the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and drawn from the 
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dataset consisted of 21,143 personnel who were new hires in 
years 1994-1995. Between 1994-1995 and 2003, 3,267 (15.4%) 
employees were interstate migrants.  The data were set up 
as an unbalanced panel with a total of 132,068 
observations. 
This study uses ordinary least squares (OLS), probit 
and Heckman selection-correction techniques to explore two 
returns to mobility measures: compensation and promotion.  
Multivariate models were specified and estimated for each 
performance measure.  The results indicated workers who 
migrate are more likely subsequently to be promoted.  
Migration is a strategic move for workers to advance and 
maximize their personal utility since migrants earn higher 
salaries than non-migrants.  Females present no evidence of 
tied-mover effects, and pursue promotion and salary 
opportunities like males.  Women promote faster than men, 
and women migrants increase their promotion rates even 
more.  Females, however, earn lower salaries than males.  
The models also reveal that veterans earn lower salaries 
than non-veterans, and have no significant advantages in 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Since the middle of the twentieth century, labor 
migration has been the subject of extensive studies.  These 
studies have primarily focused on the determinants and the 
effects of migration in the labor market.  Migration is 
often viewed as an adjusting mechanism that alleviates 
economic imbalances in the labor market.  When workers move 
in pursuit of individual utility maximization, they shift 
the labor supply in the market.  The quantity of labor 
demanded then adjusts to reach an efficient allocation of 
services, thus establishing a new equilibrium point.   
Studies based on the human capital model view 
migration as an investment in human capital stock.  Human 
capital stock is constantly accumulated during an 
employee’s lifespan in the form of experience.  
Additionally, migration and education enhancement also 
increase human capital investments.  Those individuals who 
invest in human capital must believe that the near-term 
costs of augmenting their human capital stock, i.e. moving 
or going back to school, outweigh the discounted stream of 
future benefits once the investment is undertaken.   
When it comes to migration, there are various costs 
associated with moving the worker must consider.  Such 
direct monetary costs include moving expenses, lodging 
expenses, and any other expense that diminishes the 
worker’s financial position.  Psychic costs to the 
individual must also be evaluated, and include factors such 
as how attached the worker is to the originating community, 
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and to what degree of an inconvenience it is to transfer to 
another location. 
Human capital can be divided into two types: general 
and specific.  General human capital enhances worker 
productivity universally.  Adequate knowledge of general 
mathematical procedures is a piece of general human 
capital, because it can be utilized at many places of 
employment.  On the other hand, specific human capital 
enhances worker productivity only within a distinct place 
of employment.  Training in the use of a specific piece of 
proprietary software unique to one company is an example of 
specific human capital; it cannot be transferred if the 
worker migrates to a company that does not utilize the same 
software.  It is this specific human capital that is 
typically lost in the process of migration. 
While the literature regarding migration offers many 
studies as to its monetary returns, limited information is 
available regarding migration within internal labor 
markets.  Internal labor markets can often avoid the loss 
of specific human capital because it is frequently 
transferable within the organization, regardless of 
migratory patterns.  Furthermore, psychic costs can be 
reduced as the workers already have information regarding 
various aspects of the company, thus the anxiety of moving 
is somewhat diminished.  The Department of Defense (DoD) is 
an internal labor market that observes large scale economic 
effects within its own system.  Migration within the DoD is 
unique in that there is a diminished loss of specific human 
capital and there are less psychic costs associated with 
moving.  Because of these decreased costs, people may have 
a tendency to move for reasons other than monetary or 
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professional gains (because it will take less benefit to 
overcome the decreased cost) and movers might behave 
differently than in external labor markets.  It is of 
interest to see if the returns to migration within the 
Department of Defense compare to those in general external 
labor markets.   
 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this study is to identify the returns 
to migration, both in terms of salary expectations and 
promotion opportunities for civilian personnel within the 
DoD internal labor market.  Furthermore, it is of interest 
to explore whether gender differences exist in the DoD. 
Finally, because veterans may have superior information, 
regarding DoD opportunities, and may experience lower 
psychic costs due to their familiarity with DoD processes, 
it is relevant to observe how veterans behave compared to 
non-veteran counterparts regarding migration, wages and 
promotion. 
 
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The data analyzed were limited to full-time, General 
Schedule Department of Defense employees who were paid 
annually.  Demographic variables were limited to gender, 
race, education, prior military service and labor market 
experience.  Our data did not include marital status, which 
could influence migration because of tied-movers or 
stayers, or family size which is a large determinant of the 
cost of moving.  Salary was restricted to base pay only, 
not accounting for any kind of bonuses which may affect 
migration choices.  It is assumed that the data used for 
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this study, specifically state, grade and salary 
information, are accurate.   
 
D. COURSE OF THE STUDY 
Five chapters comprise this thesis.  Chapter II 
reviews pertinent literature and previous studies conducted 
on the subject of migration.  Chapter III describes the 
dataset and variables used for the models.  It also 
explains the statistical models and techniques used for the 
study.  Chapter IV consists of preliminary analyses, 
multivariate ordinary linear models analyses, probit 
regression analyses, and Heckman selection-correction 
estimates.  Chapter V summarizes the conclusions of the 
analyses and presents recommendations for further study. 
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II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
A. THE GENERAL SCHEDULE SYSTEM 
The General Schedule (GS) System was established in 
the United States with the Classification Act of 1949.  
This federal pay system established a standard for placing 
positions according to class and grade.  The Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM), in conjunction with other 
federal agencies, defines the various classes in terms of 
duties, responsibilities and qualification requirements 
(OPM 1995, 3).  The GS system classifies positions in the 
administrative, clerical, professional and technical 
occupations and consists of 15 grades with ten steps within 
each grade.  Grades correlate to salary levels and steps 
within grade also incur smaller increases in pay.  
Employees advance through the series of steps and grades 
according to performance and length of service.  
As within the military force, compensation for GS 
employees is adjusted for local cost-of-living differences 
in the form of an allowance called locality pay.  The 
amount of locality pay varies depending on the geographic 
location of the employee.  Employees are also eligible for 
relocation bonuses only if the employee must relocate to 
accept a position that is deemed by OPM, or an affiliate 
agency, to be difficult to fill in the absence of the 
bonus.  The amount of the relocation bonus can be up to 25 
percent of the annual rate of the employee’s basic pay.  
Should an employee’s unusually high or unique 
qualifications be deemed essential to an agency to retain 
an employee, a retention incentive is also offered in the 
form of a continuation bonus.  Like the relocation bonus, 
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the retention incentive cannot exceed 25 percent of the 
employee’s basic salary.  Table 1 shows the base salaries 
corresponding to grade and step for the year 2003. 
 
Table 1. General Schedule 2003 Base Salaries*
 
Grade Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 Step 7 Step 8 Step 9 Step 10 
1 15,214 15,722 16,228 16,731 17,238 17,536 18,034 18,538 18,559 19,031 
2 17,106 17,512 18,079 18,559 18,767 19,319 19,871 20,423 20,975 21,527 
3 18,664 19,286 19,908 20,530 21,152 21,774 22,396 23,018 23,640 24,262 
4 20,952 21,650 22,348 23,046 23,744 24,442 25,140 25,838 26,536 27,234 
5 23,442 24,223 25,004 25,785 26,566 27,347 28,128 28,909 29,690 30,471 
6 26,130 27,001 27,872 28,743 29,614 30,485 31,356 32,227 33,098 33,969 
7 29,037 30,005 30,973 31,941 32,909 33,877 34,845 35,813 36,781 37,749 
8 32,158 33,230 34,302 35,374 36,446 37,518 38,590 39,662 40,734 41,806 
9 35,519 36,703 37,887 39,071 40,255 41,439 42,623 43,807 44,991 46,175 
10 39,115 40,419 41,723 43,027 44,331 45,635 46,939 48,243 49,547 50,851 
11 42,976 44,409 45,842 47,275 48,708 50,141 51,574 53,007 54,440 55,873 
12 51,508 53,225 54,942 56,659 58,376 60,093 61,810 63,527 65,244 66,961 
13 61,251 63,293 65,335 67,377 69,419 71,461 76,503 75,545 77,587 79,629 
14 72,381 74,794 77,207 79,620 82,033 84,446 86,859 89,272 91,685 94,098 
15 85,140 87,978 90,816 93,654 96,492 99,330 102,168 105,006 107,844 110,682 
 
Promotion within grade in the GS system consists of a 
maximum increase of two steps above the salary prior to 
promotion.  Advancement to a higher step represents a 3% 
salary increase, while promotion to a higher grade results 
in a 10% salary rise (Spyropoulos 2005, 3).  To be eligible 
for promotion, employees must meet the position’s 
qualification requirements, time-in-grade requirements and 
have satisfactory performance ratings.  
 
B. THE HUMAN CAPITAL MODEL 
All workers embody a set of knowledge, skills and 
abilities collectively referred to as human capital.  The 
human capital model suggests that investments in human 
capital “stock” at an earlier period yield higher returns 
(wages) over the long run.  Workers assume three primary 
                     * From Office of Personnel Management. Salary Table 2003-GS. 
[online]; available from  http://www.opm.gov/oca/03tables/html/gs.asp. 
Accessed 13 August 2005. 
types of human capital investments throughout their 
lifetime: 1) increases in education, experience and 
training, 2) migration and 3) new job search.  In the 
model, worker migration is further viewed as a net present 
value calculation.  Workers incur costs associated with 
migration in the near term in order to enhance their 
utility at a later period.  If the discounted benefits 
associated with the move exceed the costs over the long 
run, including psychic and monetary costs, the person will 
move.  This calculation is exemplified in the Net Present 
Value formula: 







− −+∑ ,  
where: 
jtB  = the utility derived from the new job (j) in year t 
otB   = the utility derived from the old job (o) in year t 
T    = the time length (in years) expected to work at job j 
r  = the discount rate 
C  = the utility lost in the move itself (direct and  
  psychic costs) 
∑  = the sum of the yearly discounted net benefits  
  over a period of time from year 1 to year T  
 
                     
   † From Ronald Ehrenberg and Robert Smith. Modern Labor Economics: 




As the formula demonstrates, so long as the utility 
derived from the new job (j) exceeds the utility derived 
from the old job (o), accounting for all other psychic and 
monetary costs associated with the move, and discounting  
over time (T), we can assume that the individual will 
decide to move.  This is because the net present value of 
the benefits of moving exceeds all the costs.   
 
C. PREVIOUS MIGRATION STUDIES 
There is an extensive amount of studies on migration.  
Michael Greenwood, in his Research on Internal Migration in 
the United States: A Survey (1975), provides a 
comprehensive summary of contemporary migration studies 
dealing with the determinants of migration.  Among the many 
studies mentioned, the works of Schultz (1961), Becker 
(1962) and Sjaastad (1962) emphasize the notion that people 
move to enhance individual utility (such as wages), and 
that migration is a form of human capital investment.  
Their findings claim that the income the mover expects to 
earn at each alternative destination influences his 
decision to move.  Greenwood further emphasizes the human 
capital model by telling us that “the relevant income 
measure... is the present discounted value of his expected 
future stream of net returns” (1975).   Still focusing on 
wages, Lansing and Morgan (1967) further compare the 
incomes of migrants and non-migrants.  Their study finds 
that even when controlling for education, migrants have 
lower annual incomes that non-migrants.   Wertheimer (1970) 
estimates the returns to U. S. migration for south to north 
as well as rural to urban migration and concludes that 
monetary returns do not emerge until after the fifth year 
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following the move, suggesting that migrants must be 
accepting “immediate earnings cuts for greater growth of 
future earnings” (Greenwood 1975).  Hunt and Kau (1985) 
find that repeat migrants experience higher wages over non-
migrants and one-time movers.    
It is acknowledged that psychic costs impact the 
decision to migrate by influencing the costs of migration.   
Some studies have used distance as a proxy for psychic 
costs (Sjaastad 1962); while others transform these costs 
into permanent transformation costs (Schwartz 1973).  
Schwartz argues that psychic costs can be monetized by 
calculating the needed frequency of visits to the place of 
origin by the mover.  Furthermore, he claims that frequency 
is likely to increase with age; therefore, psychic costs of 
moving are likely to rise with age along with the deterring 
effects of distance.  Greenwood (1975) suggests that the 
psychic costs of moving away from family and friends or the 
psychic benefits of moving closer to them may be 
substantial enough to affect migration behavior.   
Other costs of migration include the loss of specific 
human capital.  Information regarding the workplace 
procedures and other locality information also affects the 
migration decision.  Greenwood’s survey reveals that 
information about a certain locale increases the propensity 
of that person to move to that area, rather than another 
for which the person knows nothing about (1975).   
Studies reveal certain demographic characteristics are 
likely to exert influence on the decision to migrate.   
Age, education level and race are factors affecting 
migration (Greenwood 1975).  The probability that a worker 
will migrate is likely to decrease as age increases. 
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Employment information and job opportunities are both 
expected to increase with increased education (Greenwood 
1975).  Furthermore, the correlation between education and 
migration becomes stronger as distance increases (Suval and 
Hamilton 1965, Hunt and Kau 1985), suggesting that the 
market for the better-educated tends to be more national in 
scope, and more and better information concerning job 
opportunities are available to better-educated people.   
While the literature available on migration primarily 
focuses on its monetary returns, the literature research 
found no previous studies isolating migration’s effect on 
promotion.  Perhaps this is because, in general, promotions 
generate an increase in wages.  Studies pertaining to 
promotion in the General Schedule system, however, were 
conducted.  A recent study by Spyropoulos (2005) revealed 
that females received lower salaries and were less likely 
to be promoted than men even though they received better 
performance ratings.  Minorities were also paid less than 
non-minority workers; and veterans were paid more, 
performed better, and were more likely to become 
supervisors.  Studies also found a strong correlation of 
education with both wages and promotion (Asch 2001, 
Spyropoulos 2005), suggesting that better educated 
employees tend to be paid more and are promoted faster.  
Contrasting Spyropoulos, Mehay and Pema (2004) found that 
women have superior promotion rates compared to men, and 
experience higher salary growth rates over time; however, 
they are less likely to be promoted to supervisory 
positions.  No studies analyzing migration strictly within 
an internal labor market were found. 
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DATASET 
This study employs panel data provided by the Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and drawn from the Department 
of Defense Civilian Personnel Data Files.  The dataset 
consisted of two cohorts.  The first one includes 17,053 
civilian employees who were hired in 1994 and whose careers 
were tracked until 2003.  The second cohort consists of 
16,530 personnel employed in 1995 who were also followed 
until 2003.  The dataset was refined by removing data that 
were obviously erroneous or unnecessary for the purpose of 
this study.  This dataset was then restricted to General 
Schedule personnel who worked on a full-time status and 
were between the ages of 21 to 61 at the time of service 
entry.  The final dataset consisted of 21,143 personnel of 
whom 3,267 (15.4%) were interstate migrants.  The data were 
set up as an unbalanced panel with a total of 132,068 
observations.  
 
B. VARIABLE INTRODUCTION 
1. Dependent Variables 
The models in this study analyze the effect of 
migration on salaries and promotion.  The first outcome is 
the yearly compensation of each employee (yrcomp).  Its 
natural log form, lyrcomp, is used in the regressions and 
equals the natural log of each employee’s annual wages.  
The natural log is used to account for wage changes due to 
inflation.  As previously mentioned, the yearly 
compensation variable accounts for annual base pay and 
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excludes any potential bonuses an individual might have 
received.   
Promote is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the 
individual was promoted from one grade to another during 
the observed year.  This variable was generated by 
observing the change in grade from one year to the next.  
If the individual moved up in grade from one year to the 
next, promote takes a value of one, zero otherwise.   
 
2. Independent Variables 
Independent variables are the explanatory factors that 
have the potential of affecting wages or promotion.  The 
independent variables included in the regressions attempt 
to capture human capital endowments and background 
characteristics.   
Migrate is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the 
individual moved from one state to another in a given year.   
People migrating abroad were excluded from the sample.  
Migrate is the primary variable of interest in this study. 
Grade is a continuous variable equal to the General 
Schedule paygrade of the individual during the year it was 
observed.  
Years of federal service (totfedyrs) account for an 
individual’s federal experience or tenure, prior to being 
hired in 1994-1995.  As with every experience variable, its 
squared form (totfedysq) is included in the regressions to 
control for any diminishing returns in wages or promotions. 
Labor market experience (lmktexp) and experience 
squared (lmktexpsq) represent the years of working 
experience an individual had before entering civil service 
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for the Department of Defense.  The variable was generated 
for each individual by subtracting education years, years 
of federal experience, and six (a base value) from age at 
the time of hiring.  Age and years of education variables 
were provided in the original DMDC datasets. 
To account for performance, the performance evaluation 
rating (perf) of each individual was reported during the 
year when it was observed.  Performance ratings take 
integer values from one to five, with five given to the 
best performing employees. 
To control for education, dichotomous variables were 
generated for personnel who entered civil service with a 
Baccalaureate (bach0), a Master’s (mastr0), or a Doctorate 
(phd0) degree.    
Demographic controls for race (white, black, hisp, 
othrace) and gender (female) were included in all 
specifications.  A female-migrate interaction term (femmig) 
was created to control for tied-mover effects, since 
females are more likely to move to maximize total household 
utility, rather than personal job enhancement.  
 Department of Defense Agency dummies were used to 
control for agency specific factors.  These included army, 
navy, usmc, usaf, and other DoD agency (othagcy).  Examples 
of other agencies include the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA), the Defense Commissary Agency 
(DECA) or the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). 
 Controls for veteran status (vetrn) were included 
primarily to observe veteran behavior, but also because 
veterans receive total federal service years credit for 
military experience.  Additionally, veterans may receive 
preferential treatment at hiring and may choose different 
career paths due to prior service.   
 
C. MODELS 
1. The Salary Model 
The goal of this model is to estimate the determinants 
of yearly compensation for DoD civilian personnel.  This 
model is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  The 
sample regression function we used is as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13
log( )
.
it i i i
i i it it it
it t it it it
yrcomp migrate female race education
agency vetrn lmktexp lmktexpsq totfedyrs
totfedysq year perf grade u
β β β β β
β β β β β
β β β β
= + + + +
+ + + +
+ + + +
+
+  
Being a log-level model, an increase of one in any 
parameter x returns a percentage change of 100 iˆβ  on y.  
Because of errors for each individual are likely to be 
correlated over time, the estimations adjust the standard 
errors for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.  Year 
dummies are included in all regressions to control for 
changes in the economy or organization over time that 
affect everyone the same way. 
 
2. The Promotion Model 
This model estimated the determinants of promotion 
within the DoD.  In this model, the dependent variable 
promote takes on a value of zero or one.  Estimating a 
model with a binary dependent variable using linear methods 
can yield parameter fitted probabilities greater than one 
or less than zero.  Furthermore, linear probability models 
induce a heteroskedastic variance.  To overcome these 
drawbacks, our study uses a binary response probit model.  
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The general form of our binary response model is as 
follows: 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13
( 1) (
),
it i i i
i i it it it
it t it it it
P promote migrate female race education
agency vetrn lmktexp lmktexpsq totfedyrs
totfedysq year perf grade u
β β β β β
β β β β β
β β β β
= = Φ + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + +
  
where 0 ( )z 1< Φ < . 
In our promotion probit model, the partial effect of an 
explanatory variable, such as migrate, returns the change 
in the estimated probability of a promotion for an 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
17 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
We commence our preliminary review by looking at all 
personnel at their time of entry.  With the aid of 
hindsight, we were able to identify the individuals who 
migrated to different states at least one time during the 
ten year period.  The sample was then divided using this 
criterion and the employee’s year of entry.  Table 2 
displays descriptive statistics for all workers who 
remained in service for the duration of the ten year period 
and highlights the statistically significant differences 
between migrant and non-migrant employees at their time of 
entry.  The overall mean salary is $27,083, with migrants 
exhibiting around 3% higher mean salaries ($27,872) than 
non-migrants $(26,939).  Migrants start at slightly higher 
grades than non-migrants, but enter federal service with 
lower labor market experience years (9.8 vs. 12).  Female 
representation is about 48%.  With respect to education, 
23% of the sample has a Baccalaureate degree, 8% a Master’s 
degree and 1% a Doctorate.  Migrants appear to be more 
educated; however, individuals holding Doctorate degrees 
tend to become more sedentary.  Minor differences in 
migratory behavior appear to exist among the racial groups 
represented, with whites forming the majority.  Veterans 
constitute about 26% of the sample and do not seem to 
migrate at different rates from the rest of the group.  Of 
the five agencies, civil service employees in the Army and 
the Air Force show the highest tendencies for migration, 
while the Navy and other DoD agency employees favor more 
sedentary careers.  Employees in the Marine Corps
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Table 2. Summary Statistics at Entry 
 
 ALL MIGRANTS NON-MIGRANTS   
 Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev T-test P-value 
yrcomp 27083.73 11723.08 27872.17 10402.66 26939.63 11943.28 4.18 0.000 
grade 7.0875 3.0933 7.4178 2.9353 7.0272 3.1176 6.64 0.000 
lmktexp 11.6964 9.4427 9.8895 8.7036 12.0266 9.5349 -11.93 0.000 
totfedyrs 4.6856 5.7748 4.8087 5.5878 4.6631 5.8082 1.32 0.185 
bach0 0.2310 0.4215 0.2886 0.4532 0.2205 0.4146 8.52 0.000 
mastr0 0.0834 0.2765 0.1093 0.3120 0.0787 0.2693 5.81 0.123 
phd0 0.0163 0.1267 0.0101 0.1000 0.0175 0.1310 -3.02 0.002 
female 0.4829 0.4997 0.4688 0.4991 0.4855 0.4998 -1.75 0.079 
black 0.1592 0.3659 0.1726 0.3780 0.1568 0.3636 2.27 0.023 
hisp 0.0476 0.2129 0.0508 0.2196 0.0470 0.2116 0.94 0.346 
white 0.7257 0.4462 0.7138 0.4521 0.7278 0.4451 -1.65 0.098 
othrace 0.0648 0.2462 0.0582 0.2341 0.0660 0.2483 -1.68 0.094 
army 0.4120 0.4922 0.4209 0.4938 0.4103 0.4919 1.13 0.260 
navy 0.1908 0.3930 0.1772 0.3819 0.1933 0.3949 -2.15 0.031 
usmc 0.0194 0.1381 0.0174 0.1310 0.0198 0.1393 -0.90 0.370 
usaf 0.2335 0.4230 0.2614 0.4395 0.2284 0.4198 4.11 0.000 
othagcy 0.1443 0.3514 0.1230 0.3285 0.1482 0.3553 -3.76 0.000 
vetrn 0.2665 0.4421 0.2553 0.4361 0.2686 0.4432 -1.58 0.114 
biosci 0.0118 0.1081 0.0073 0.0854 0.0126 0.1117 -2.58 0.010 
physci 0.0273 0.1631 0.0150 0.1216 0.0296 0.1695 -4.71 0.000 
engineer 0.1005 0.3007 0.1564 0.3633 0.0903 0.2866 11.59 0.000 
medical 0.1631 0.3695 0.1071 0.3093 0.1734 0.3786 -9.44 0.000 
design 0.0132 0.1143 0.0178 0.1321 0.0124 0.1107 2.45 0.014 
legal 0.0184 0.1342 0.0254 0.1574 0.0171 0.1295 3.27 0.001 
educator 0.0517 0.2214 0.0425 0.2019 0.0534 0.2248 -2.57 0.010 
library 0.0051 0.0713 0.0031 0.0552 0.0055 0.0738 -1.79 0.074 
logitmgt 0.0614 0.2401 0.1087 0.3113 0.0528 0.2237 12.27 0.000 
personnel 0.0385 0.1925 0.0361 0.1866 0.0390 0.1936 -0.78 0.433 
datasys 0.0303 0.1713 0.0266 0.1610 0.0309 0.1731 -1.32 0.187 
centmgt 0.0117 0.1075 0.0178 0.1321 0.0106 0.1023 3.51 0.000 
logitech 0.0638 0.2444 0.0514 0.2209 0.0661 0.2484 -3.15 0.002 
mgtech 0.0869 0.2817 0.0673 0.2506 0.0905 0.2868 -4.32 0.000 
clerk 0.2035 0.4026 0.1892 0.3917 0.2061 0.4045 -2.22 0.027 
polfire 0.0715 0.2576 0.0701 0.2553 0.0717 0.2580 -0.33 0.741 
socsci 0.0423 0.2012 0.0392 0.1941 0.0429 0.2025 -0.96 0.338 
Obs. 21,143 3,267 17,876   
 
demonstrate no significant migration preferences.  Of the 
many occupational groups represented, engineers and 
logisticians seem to have larger proportions of mobile 
personnel.  Scientists and workers in the medical field are 
more non-migrant than mobile, perhaps due to licensing 
regulations between states and the availability of specific 
scientific equipment.   
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 We now turn our attention to summary statistics for 
the same cohort of personnel but for those who stay in the 
civil service until 2003.  Descriptive statistics for the 
year 2003 are presented in Table 3 with attention given to 
the differences among migrating workers and non-migrating 
workers.  A preliminary review of the data indicated an 
overall mean annual salary in 2003 of approximately 
$49,000.  The overall promotion rate is 11.5%.  Because of 
the panel nature of the data, this figure seems misleading, 
but it only measures those who only promoted in 2003.  
Across the ten year period, the promotion rate is 0.42, 
with a standard deviation of 0.49.  The retention rate 
among the new hires is 60%.  Females represent 45% of the 
sample.  The overall average age in 2003 is 46 years old, 
and veterans constitute about 29% of the sample.  Of the 
whole sample, 15% of the workers are migrants.   
Migrant employees exhibit higher mean salaries 
($53,384) than non-migrants ($47,877), an estimated 11% 
higher for migrants.  This difference could be due to their 
higher education levels at entry.  Migrants are also more 
likely to be promoted, showing a mean promotion rate of 
almost 15%, while non-migrants have a rate of 10%.  As the 
human capital model predicts, migrants tend to be younger 
and have less labor market experience than non-migrants.  
Compared to the entry cohort, veterans now show lower 
migration rates, perhaps suggesting moving fatigue due to 
the many prior moves characteristic of active duty military 
members.  Now that we are able observe their performance 
ratings, it is of interest that migrants and non-migrants 
seem to perform no different from each other.  No 
significant differences were encountered with gender and
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for Year 2003 
 
 ALL MIGRANTS NON-MIGRANTS   
 Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev T-test P-value 
yrcomp 49225.23 18251.31 53384.79 18028.06 47877.58 18120.56 13.15 0.000 
grade 9.6192 3.1625 10.4711 3.0253 9.3432 3.1570 15.60 0.000 
lmktexp 10.9056 8.9285 8.6708 8.3289 11.6296 8.9965 -14.47 0.000 
totfedyrs 14.6750 6.0565 15.1929 6.2842 14.5071 5.9717 4.90 0.000 
perf 3.9105 0.9565 3.9171 0.9646 3.9084 0.9540 0.38 0.701 
promote 0.1150 0.3190 0.1496 0.3568 0.1037 0.3049 6.18 0.000 
bach0 0.2179 0.4128 0.2535 0.4351 0.2063 0.4047 4.95 0.000 
mastr0 0.0839 0.2773 0.0914 0.2882 0.0815 0.2736 1.54 0.123 
phd0 0.0140 0.1173 0.0093 0.0960 0.0155 0.1234 -2.27 0.023 
female 0.4566 0.4981 0.4513 0.4977 0.4583 0.4983 -0.61 0.544 
black 0.1513 0.3584 0.1739 0.3791 0.1440 0.3511 3.61 0.000 
hisp 0.0510 0.2199 0.0518 0.2216 0.0507 0.2194 0.21 0.835 
white 0.7230 0.4475 0.7048 0.4562 0.7289 0.4445 -2.33 0.020 
othrace 0.0725 0.2594 0.0647 0.2460 0.0751 0.2635 -1.73 0.084 
army 0.4250 0.4944 0.4424 0.4968 0.4194 0.4935 2.01 0.044 
navy 0.1680 0.3739 0.1557 0.3626 0.1720 0.3774 -1.89 0.059 
usmc 0.0185 0.1348 0.0137 0.1165 0.0200 0.1402 -2.02 0.043 
usaf 0.2500 0.4330 0.2507 0.4335 0.2497 0.4329 0.10 0.920 
othagcy 0.1385 0.3455 0.1375 0.3444 0.1389 0.3458 -0.17 0.832 
vetrn 0.2995 0.4581 0.2818 0.4500 0.3053 0.4605 -2.21 0.027 
biosci 0.0127 0.1118 0.0109 0.1039 0.0132 0.1143 -0.89 0.371 
physci 0.0178 0.1323 0.0101 0.1001 0.0203 0.1411 -3.33 0.001 
engineer 0.1242 0.3298 0.1488 0.3560 0.1162 0.3205 4.28 0.000 
medical 0.1282 0.3344 0.0789 0.2696 0.1442 0.3514 -8.48 0.000 
design 0.0156 0.1241 0.0162 0.1262 0.0155 0.1234 0.25 0.803 
legal 0.0262 0.1598 0.0267 0.1612 0.0261 0.1594 0.17 0.867 
educator 0.0514 0.2207 0.0404 0.1970 0.0549 0.2278 -2.83 0.005 
library 0.0046 0.0673 0.0044 0.0666 0.0046 0.0676 -0.09 0.930 
logitmgt 0.0881 0.2834 0.1233 0.3289 0.0766 0.2660 7.14 0.000 
personnel 0.0426 0.2021 0.0493 0.2166 0.0405 0.1971 1.89 0.058 
datasys 0.0013 0.0358 0.0020 0.0449 0.0010 0.0324 1.17 0.240 
centmgt 0.0132 0.1140 0.0113 0.1058 0.0138 0.1165 -0.92 0.356 
logitech 0.0600 0.2374 0.0526 0.2232 0.0624 0.2418 -1.78 0.075 
mgtech 0.0584 0.2345 0.0433 0.2035 0.0633 0.2435 -3.69 0.000 
clerk 0.2010 0.4007 0.1945 0.3959 0.2031 0.4023 -0.92 0.356 
polfire 0.0638 0.2445 0.0679 0.2517 0.0625 0.2421 0.96 0.336 
socsci 0.0293 0.1686 0.0239 0.1526 0.0310 0.1735 -1.84 0.065 
Obs. 10,106 2,473 7,633   
 
race variables between the two groups.  Like the entry 
cohort, the occupations which seem to take advantage of 
migration are engineers and logistics managers, both 
showing higher salaries and promotion rates.  Employees in 
the medical field still stand out as being less likely to 
migrate. 
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Mean grades for migrants and non-migrants at entry 
time and in 2003 are compared in Table 3.  Migrants enter 
at higher grades and finish at higher grades, suggesting 
that a systematic difference exists between migrants and 
non-migrants. 
 
Table 4. Mean Grades for Migrants and Non-Migrants at 







Migrants 7.42 10.47 
 
Non-migrants 7.03 9.34 
 
In aggregate, migrants seem to advance an average of 3 
grades during the observed ten year period, while non-
migrants only advance an average of 2.3 grades.  By 
individual grade, however, average promotion opportunities 
differ.  Table 4 looks at individual grades and their 
respective average promotion opportunities: 
 
Table 5. Average Grade Growth per Entry Grade 
 




Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
5  8.04 2.68 5 14 
6  8.36 1.96 6 13 
7 10.89 2.16 7 15 
8  9.85 1.61 8 13 
9 11.14 1.37 9 15 
10 10.80 0.69 10 13 
11 12.03 0.93 11 15 
12 12.84 0.79 12 15 
13 13.54 0.64 13 15 
14 14.46 0.50 14 15 
15 15       0 15 15 
 
An employee joining DoD at grade 5 received on average 
3.04 grade increases for the ten year period, increasing to 
an average grade of 8.04.  Similarly, an individual who 
entered service at grade 12 received an average of 0.84 
grade promotions until the end of the ten year period.  The 
decreasing average promotion rate seems to be a result of 
the hierarchical nature of the DoD and highlights its 
structural limitations regarding promotion at higher levels 
of responsibility.  As an individual advances in grade, 
promotion opportunities tend to decline due to fewer 
positions available at the upper levels of the hierarchy.  
The following section discusses the estimation results for 
the salary regressions. 
 
B. SALARY MODEL ANALYSIS 
The Salary Model estimates the determinants of the log 
of yearly compensation (lyrcomp) for DoD employees who 
remained in service until 2003.  As previously mentioned, 
the salary variable lyrcomp, only measures annual base 
salary and does not include any bonuses the employee may 
have received.  In our model, 
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the unobserved composite error  from each individual is 
likely to be correlated over time due to the use of pooled 
OLS on panel data.  In panel data, the error term  is 
usually defined as: 
itu
itu
it i itu a v= + , 
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where  corresponds to the unobserved individual effect 
that does not vary over time, or fixed effect.  This fixed 
effect could be in the form of unobserved ability, 
motivation or any other unobserved factor.  The time-
varying, or idiosyncratic error, , represents the 
unobserved factors that change over time and across 
individuals.  For individuals, ability is likely to be 
constant over time, so one way to correct for this fixed 
effect time correlation is by the use of robust standard 
errors.  The model is therefore estimated by pooled OLS 
using Newey-West robust standard errors to correct for 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.   
ia
itv
Regression estimates are presented in Table 6.  The 
baseline OLS regression includes demographic and human 
capital attributes, but omits performance and grade 
variables.  The baseline regression results are included in 
Column 1.  Migrants earn 9.3% higher salaries than non-
migrants.  Women and racial minorities earn lower salaries.  
Women, in particular, earn 19% lower salaries than men, and 
female migrants earn even lower salaries (almost 22% less).  
Veterans also earn lower salaries (4.2% less).  As 
predicted in the human capital model, individuals holding 
higher education degrees experience higher salaries.  PhD 
degree holders earn about 67% more than people with High 
School diplomas or less, while Master’s degree holders earn 
40% higher salaries than High School diploma holders.  A 
Baccalaureate degree increases salaries by almost 30%.  
Prior experience (lmktexp) and prior tenure (totfedyrs) 
acquired before joining the DoD seem to have little impact 
on salaries, perhaps due to the specialization of positions 
within the Department of Defense.  Tenure before joining
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Table 6. Regression Results of the Effect of Migration on 
Salaries 
Dependent Variable: lyrcomp (Log of Yearly Compensation) 
Model (1)OLS (2)OLS (3)OLS (4)OLS 
migrate 0.0934 0.0886 -0.0114 0.0494 
 (0.0065)*** (0.0074)*** (0.0024)*** (0.0047)*** 
female -0.1888 -0.2012 -0.0143 -0.0492 
 (0.0052)*** (0.0057)*** (0.0018)*** (0.0033)*** 
femmig -0.0293 -0.0107 -0.0038 -0.0004 
 (0.0095)*** (0.0109) (0.0035) (0.0068) 
black -0.1125 -0.1120 0.0062 -0.0240 
 (0.0060)*** (0.0065)*** (0.0019)*** (0.0037)*** 
hisp -0.0883 -0.0849 0.0053 -0.0205 
 (0.0100)*** (0.0108)*** (0.0030)* (0.0060)*** 
othrace -0.0678 -0.0720 0.0162 0.0040 
 (0.0091)*** (0.0096)*** (0.0028)*** (0.0058) 
bach0 0.2984 0.2997 0.0128 0.1076 
 (0.0055)*** (0.0060)*** (0.0020)*** (0.0040)*** 
mastr0 0.4066 0.3963 0.0223 0.0728 
 (0.0073)*** (0.0077)*** (0.0030)*** (0.0050)*** 
phd0 0.6713 0.6356 0.1243 0.1200 
 (0.0175)*** (0.0180)*** (0.0091)*** (0.0102)*** 
army 0.0796 0.0599 0.0225 -0.0038 
 (0.0075)*** (0.0083)*** (0.0026)*** (0.0045) 
navy 0.0865 0.0954 0.0240 0.0351 
 (0.0086)*** (0.0093)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0052)*** 
usmc 0.0176 0.0201 -0.0079 -0.0231 
 (0.0166) (0.0177) (0.0046)* (0.0095)** 
usaf 0.1276 0.1238 0.0064 -0.0168 
 (0.0080)*** (0.0087)*** (0.0027)** (0.0047)*** 
vetrn -0.0427 -0.0377 -0.0281 -0.0235 
 (0.0061)*** (0.0066)*** (0.0020)*** (0.0034)*** 
lmktexp 0.0014 -0.0016 0.0030 -0.0104 
 (0.0008)* (0.0008)* (0.0003)*** (0.0005)*** 
lmktexpsq 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0002 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
totfedyrs 0.0067 -0.0000 0.0075 -0.0025 
 (0.0009)*** (0.0012) (0.0003)*** (0.0006)*** 
totfedysq 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)** 
time dummies yes yes yes yes 
perf  0.0361 0.0028 0.0068 
  (0.0020)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0011)*** 
grade   0.1120  
   (0.0003)***  
grade0    0.0964 
    (0.0005)*** 
Constant 10.0393 10.0006 9.2766 9.6002 
 (0.0095)*** (0.0135)*** (0.0047)*** (0.0082)*** 
Observations 132,024 104,474 104,474 104,414 
R-squared 0.46 0.44 0.91 0.79 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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DoD is used because after joining, everyone’s tenure grows 
by one year for each period, and such variable would be 
perfectly correlated with the year dummies.   
When controlling for performance (Column 2), migrants 
still experience higher salaries, but a slightly smaller 
advantage (8.9%) than in the baseline model.  This is 
expected because Column 1 results may be overestimated due 
to performance advantages affecting salaries.  With 
performance controls, of two people having the same 
performance rating, the one who migrates is expected to 
increase compensation by 8.9%.  Evidence of potential 
gender discrimination still exists as females earn 20% less 
than males.  No significant changes occur with race 
variables, while experience and tenure remain practically 
insignificant.  As in Column 1, the agency that proves to 
be most profitable for migrant employees is the Navy, with 
workers earning 9.5% higher salaries to other DoD agencies.  
Education variables continue to behave in accordance with 
the human capital model.  Most interestingly, a positive 
performance evaluation rating increases salaries by 3.6%.  
At first, it appears that migrants earn more because 
they migrate; however, when controlling for grade in Column 
3 of Table 6, migrants make 1.1% lower salaries than non- 
migrants.  The negative sign on the migration coefficient 
suggests workers who migrate within grade, do so for 
reasons other than personal utility maximization; 
therefore, as seen in Columns 1 and 2, migration seems to 
be a strategic move for workers to advance and thus 
increase their salaries.  Within grade, the potential 
gender discrimination evidence is now diminished, with 
women earning only about 1.4% percent less than men.  Race 
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parameters show no significant increases on salary.  
Experience and tenure show positive statistically 
significant coefficients, albeit very small.  An increase 
of one grade is likely to increase yearly compensation by 
11%.       
The results in Column 4 control for entry grade and 
performance.  Here, the partial effect of migrate becomes 
positive again to almost a 5% increase in salary.  Females 
now earn almost 5% less than men; however, no evidence of 
tied-movers is apparent, as the female-migrate interaction 
term is statistically insignificant.  Veterans show an 
estimated 2% lower salaries, and experience and tenure 
remain of little impact to salaries.  As in all prior 
regressions, investments in education human capital yielded 
positive salary increases proportional to the level of 
investment.    
The overall significance of the models is explained by 
the coefficient of determination, or R-squared, which is 
the proportion of the total variation in the dependent 
variable, explained by the variation in the explanatory 
variables.  From the reported R-squared, the covariates in 
Columns 1 and 2 explain approximately 46% and 44% of 
variation, respectively.  When introducing grade in the 
regression (Column 3), the reported R-squared more than 
doubles.  When controlling for performance and grade, all 
the covariates explain 91% of the total variation.  This is 
expected because pay in the General Schedule system is 
rigidly tied to grade levels.  The reported R-squared in 
Column 4 shows 79% of total variation explained when 
controlling for initial entry grade and performance.    
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 The results in the Salary Model regressions suggest 
that migration seems to be a strategic move for workers to 
advance, and therefore increase their wages.  It seems that 
workers migrate in search of promotion opportunities.  The 
Promotion Model regression estimates are reviewed in the 
next section.        
 
C. PROMOTION MODEL ANALYSIS  
The Promotion Model examines the determinants of the 
probability of promotion (promote) for DoD employees who 
remained in service until 2003.  The model was estimated 
using probit regressions and calculating covariate partial 
effects.  The results of estimating the benchmark probit on 
the probability of promotion are displayed in Columns 1 and 
2 of Table 7.  Estimates include demographic, education, 
agency, tenure and experience variables in all regressions.  
Like in the Salary Model, performance and grade variables 
were added to control for additional effects.  The baseline 
regression does not control for performance or grade and 
its results show that migrants have a 0.21 higher 
probability of being promoted than non-migrants.  This 
measure seems too large, perhaps due to self-selection, 
since we are only observing migrants that remained in the 
sample until 2003.  If we had observed other employees who 
otherwise left the sample, the partial effect might be 
smaller.  Females show no significant partial effects on 
the probability of promotion, suggesting they have equal 
opportunities for promotion as males.  Out of the racial 
groups represented, blacks show 5% lower promotion rates 
than whites. In the education variables, having a 
Baccalaureate degree increases the partial effect on 
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Table 7. Probit Model Estimates of the Effect of Migration 
on the Probability of Promotion 
 
Dependent Variable: promote 












migrate 0.6477 0.2127 0.6455 0.2085 0.5966 0.1887 0.6991 0.2260 
 (0.0261)*** (0.0099)*** (0.0295)*** (0.0111)*** (0.0295)*** (0.0109)*** (0.0300)*** (0.0113)*** 
female 0.0082 0.0022 0.0137 0.0036 0.1116 0.0286 -0.1049 -0.0265 
 (0.0104) (0.0028) (0.0108) (0.0028) (0.0113)*** (0.0029)*** (0.0113)*** (0.0028)*** 
femmig -0.0746 -0.0192 -0.0181 -0.0046 -0.0100 -0.0025 -0.0391 -0.0097 
 (0.0381)* (0.0095)** (0.0434) (0.0110) (0.0436) (0.0110) (0.0438) (0.0107) 
black -0.0560 -0.0146 -0.0547 -0.0139 0.0077 0.0020 -0.1260 -0.0306 
 (0.0130)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0136)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0138) (0.0035) (0.0138)*** (0.0032)*** 
hisp -0.0282 -0.0074 -0.0448 -0.0114 0.0034 0.0009 -0.0990 -0.0240 
 (0.0210) (0.0055) (0.0222)** (0.0055)** (0.0224) (0.0057) (0.0224)*** (0.0052)*** 
othrace 0.0116 0.0031 0.0135 0.0035 0.0611 0.0160 -0.0489 -0.0121 
 (0.0177) (0.0048) (0.0185) (0.0048) (0.0186)*** (0.0050)*** (0.0187)*** (0.0045)*** 
bach0 0.0999 0.0272 0.0801 0.0211 -0.0813 -0.0203 0.2502 0.0676 
 (0.0112)*** (0.0031)*** (0.0117)*** (0.0031)*** (0.0127)*** (0.0031)*** (0.0125)*** (0.0036)*** 
mastr0 -0.0939 -0.0241 -0.1055 -0.0261 -0.3125 -0.0699 0.1780 0.0483 
 (0.0171)*** (0.0042)*** (0.0180)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0190)*** (0.0037)*** (0.0194)*** (0.0056)*** 
phd0 -0.4250 -0.0921 -0.3967 -0.0842 -0.6864 -0.1223 0.0730 0.0191 
 (0.0440)*** (0.0074)*** (0.0455)*** (0.0076)*** (0.0465)*** (0.0051)*** (0.0471) (0.0127) 
army -0.2336 -0.0610 -0.2520 -0.0637 -0.2729 -0.0680 -0.2030 -0.0505 
 (0.0135)*** (0.0035)*** (0.0146)*** (0.0036)*** (0.0148)*** (0.0036)*** (0.0148)*** (0.0036)*** 
navy -0.0805 -0.0209 -0.0853 -0.0215 -0.1232 -0.0302 -0.0365 -0.0091 
 (0.0156)*** (0.0039)*** (0.0162)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0164)*** (0.0039)*** (0.0164)** (0.0041)** 
usmc -0.1503 -0.0374 -0.1573 -0.0378 -0.1694 -0.0399 -0.1214 -0.0290 
 (0.0345)*** (0.0080)*** (0.0358)*** (0.0079)*** (0.0359)*** (0.0078)*** (0.0362)*** (0.0081)*** 
usaf -0.3038 -0.0752 -0.3075 -0.0739 -0.3748 -0.0873 -0.1866 -0.0452 
 (0.0149)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0155)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0157)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0159)*** (0.0037)*** 
vetrn 0.0284 0.0076 0.0300 0.0078 0.0351 0.0090 0.0215 0.0055 
 (0.0120)** (0.0032)** (0.0125)** (0.0033)** (0.0126)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0127)* (0.0032)* 
lmktexp -0.0466 -0.0124 -0.0463 -0.0120 -0.0440 -0.0112 -0.0393 -0.0100 
 (0.0016)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0017)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0017)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0017)*** (0.0004)*** 
lmktexpsq 0.0007 0.0002 0.0007 0.0002 0.0006 0.0002 0.0006 0.0001 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** 
totfedyrs -0.0520 -0.0138 -0.0507 -0.0131 -0.0468 -0.0119 -0.0486 -0.0123 
 (0.0025)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0007)*** 
totfedysq 0.0007 0.0002 0.0006 0.0002 0.0004 0.0001 0.0009 0.0002 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** 
time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
perf   0.0254 0.0065 0.0059 0.0015 0.0534 0.0135 
   (0.0061)*** (0.0016)*** (0.0061) (0.0016) (0.0062)*** (0.0016)*** 
grade     0.0628 0.0160   
     (0.0019)*** (0.0005)***   
grade0       -0.0848 -0.0215 
       (0.0020)*** (0.0005)*** 
Constant 0.3732  0.2733  -0.1199  0.6030  
 (0.0216)***  (0.0335)***  (0.0357)***  (0.0346)***  
Observations 109629 109629 102560 102560 102560 102560 102503 102503 
Log 
likelihood 
-50373.45  -46135.45  -45571.67  -45128.92  
P(ŷ=1)  .1839  .1755  .1721  .1727 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
promote. Interestingly, having a degree higher than a 
Baccalaureate reduces the probability of promotion because 
highly educated individuals enter at higher grades and have 
fewer promotion possibilities.  All agencies show negative 
effects on promotion, suggesting other DoD agencies not 
directly tied to the armed forces have higher promotion 
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rates.  Veterans are more likely to be promoted but the 
magnitude on the probability of promotion is minimal 
(0.0076).  Prior experience and tenure prior to federal 
service show negative effects on promotion. 
Columns 3 and 4 show the probit results when 
controlling for performance.  Performance, as expected, has 
a positive effect on promotion.  Migrants continue to have 
significantly larger promotion rates, with the partial 
effect of migrate remaining relatively unchanged.  
Promotion rates for females appear to be still no different 
than those of males.  Blacks and Hispanics display 
statistically significant lower rates of promotion of 
around 0.05 lower than whites.  All agencies maintain 
negative partial effects as well as the experience and 
tenure variables.   
The next probit models additionally control for grade, 
and the results are displayed in Columns 5 and 6.   The 
partial effect of migration on the probability of promotion 
is now 0.1887 and remains statistically significant, 
suggesting that of people within the same grade, those who 
migrate have an almost 0.19 higher probability of promotion 
than those who remain in the same location.  Within grade, 
females now have a higher probability of getting promoted 
(0.02), albeit small.  No evidence of racial discrimination 
exists, as all racial variables are statistically 
insignificant.   Education variables are all negative, as 
are all agency variables.  Veterans continue to exhibit 
slightly higher promotion rates, while experience, tenure 
and performance variables seem to have little effect.   It 
seems that for individuals within the same grade, the 
greatest opportunity for promotion arises with mobility.     
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The last two probit models in Columns 7 and 8, display 
the results when controlling for initial grade.  The 
variable of interest, migrate, shows the highest partial 
effect of all regressions (0.2260).  This suggests that 
when two people start at the same grade, the one that 
migrates has a 0.22 higher probability of getting promoted 
than the one who does not migrate, ceteris paribus.  A 
slight evidence of potential gender and race discrimination 
surfaces, since the coefficients of the demographic 
variables are all negative and statistically significant.  
Education variables all show positive partial effects, with 
the effect decreasing the higher the degree.  This is 
expected and suggests that as two workers of the same 
initial grade gain human capital, earning an advanced 
degree increases the probability of promotion; but the 
higher the grade, the probability decreases (but remains 
positive) due to the limited spaces available at higher 
levels.  Agencies continue to display negative partial 
effects, while prior experience and tenure remain of little 
impact.   
The results of the Promotion Model regressions support 
the prior premise of migration as a strategic move for 
workers to advance.  Throughout all regressions, migrate 
displays a positive partial effect of at least 0.18.    
Furthermore, the female-migrate interaction in all four 
regressions shows no evidence of females migrating due to a 
tied-move.  The partial effects of femmig remain negative 
in all regressions.  In the last six columns, the 
coefficients are statistically insignificant, suggesting 
that women within the DoD are in search of improving 
individual wages and personal utility.  Veterans seem to 
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have a minimal advantage as they exhibit marginally higher 
promotion rates.  
 
D. SELECTION CORRECTION 
Estimates on panel data are widely recognized to be 
subject to selection bias.  Due to attrition, the amount of 
civil service personnel employed in 2003 is not the same as 
the amount who commenced the panel sample in 1994 and 1995.  
In a truncated sample, we cannot observe the behavior of 
those who left the sample; therefore, a truncated 
regression model arises when we exclude, on the basis of 
the dependent variable, a subset of the population in our 
sample scheme.  Non-random samples can arise from either 
exogenous sample selection, meaning the sample selection is 
based on explanatory variables independent of the error 
term; or endogenous, in which the sample is related to the 
dependent variable, either directly or through the error 
term.  Endogenous explanatory variables are correlated with 
the error term due to an omitted variable or measurement 
error and thus yield biased estimates.    
The employees who leave the DoD may be placed into two 
categories: high performers or poor performers.  If the 
workers who leave the DoD belong to the high performing 
category, then they are more likely to experience higher 
promotion rates prior to separation than their peers.  High 
performers also exhibit above-average skills and thus 
partake of greater employment opportunities outside the 
DoD.  If the DoD employees are low performers, then they 
may experience below-average advancement rates and thus be 
more likely to leave and search for other opportunities 
elsewhere.   If the leavers are low performers, our results 
based on performance ratings are probably upward biased; 
alternatively, if the leavers are high performers, the 
estimates are likely to exhibit a downward bias.  
To correct for sample selection bias, two different 
empirical approaches are used, depending on the model 
estimated.  In the Salary Model, a Heckman selection 
technique is utilized, whereas for the binary promotion 
model, a similar Heckman-type correction, but with a probit 
model in the second stage, is applied.  The Heckman 
selection model (Heckman 1979) adds an explicit selection 
equation to the population of interest, where 
y x uβ= + , ( | ) 0E u x =  
is the population equation and  
( 1| )P s z z vγ= = +  
is the selection equation.  Whether the value of y for a 
person will be observed depends on a number of observable 
factors z and a random term v.  The set z should include 
the set x and have at least one more variable that affects 
selection, but does not affect y.  For the Heckman probit 
technique, the population equation is 
( 1| ) (P )y x x uβ= = Φ + , 
while the selection equation remains 
( 1| )P s z z vγ= = + . 
Both selection-corrected models are estimated through 
partial maximum likelihood (MLE), a non-linear method which 
involves the simultaneous estimation of both the population 
and selection equations. 
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The two stage models assume that stay-leave decisions 
are based on the cost and return to leaving.  The expected 
return depends in part on demographic characteristics, 
education and productivity in alternate occupational 
activities.  Alternate job prospects are proxied by dummy 
variables for major occupational categories.  Although 
retention rates will vary across occupations due to 
differences in alternative job availabilities; promotion 
rates should not vary across occupations.  Similarly, local 
labor market conditions are proxied by dummies representing 
the state of the worker’s duty location.  This approach 
represents a fixed effects estimate where the dummies 
capture permanent deviations between the retention rate for 
a given occupation or state and the overall sample average.  
The indicator variables for occupations and local labor 
market conditions serve as the identifying instruments.   
Since we estimate a static 2003 model, three variables 
were adjusted to compensate for any missing values.  The 
binary variable evermig was generated to substitute the 
original migration variable, and equals to one if an 
individual ever observed a migratory move during the ten 
year period.  For individuals who left the sample by 2003, 
the missing values for grade were replaced with their last 
observed grade, and missing values for the performance 
variable where replaced with the average of the overall 
observed performance ratings.     
The selection-adjusted outcomes are presented in 
Tables 8 and 9.  First-stage retention models are displayed 
in Appendix Tables A and B.  The selection-corrected Salary 
Model (Table 8) shows that migrants earn close to 6% higher 
salaries than non-migrants.  Females earn 15% lower 
Table 8. Selection Adjusted Estimates of the Effect of 
Migration on Salaries 
 
Dependent Variable: lyrcomp 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
evermig 0.0577 0.0647 -0.0060 0.0551 
 (0.0070)*** (0.0069)*** (0.0026)** (0.0053)*** 
female -0.1561 -0.1645 -0.0289 -0.0422 
 (0.0097)*** (0.0096)*** (0.0032)*** (0.0072)*** 
femmig 0.0333 0.0345 -0.0248 0.0383 
 (0.0220) (0.0228) (0.0082)*** (0.0183)** 
black -0.1061 -0.1005 0.0106 -0.0289 
 (0.0116)*** (0.0117)*** (0.0045)** (0.0086)*** 
hisp -0.1029 -0.0968 0.0099 -0.0431 
 (0.0180)*** (0.0180)*** (0.0051)* (0.0126)*** 
othrace -0.1351 -0.1110 0.0151 -0.0357 
 (0.0155)*** (0.0152)*** (0.0045)*** (0.0110)*** 
bach0 0.2449 0.2471 0.0210 0.1090 
 (0.0100)*** (0.0096)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0073)*** 
mastr0 0.3214 0.3170 0.0305 0.0727 
 (0.0134)*** (0.0129)*** (0.0044)*** (0.0098)*** 
phd0 0.5955 0.5917 0.1141 0.1669 
 (0.0308)*** (0.0299)*** (0.0110)*** (0.0229)*** 
army -0.0018 -0.0625 0.0161 -0.0669 
 (0.0145) (0.0150)*** (0.0091)* (0.0112)*** 
navy 0.0585 0.0797 0.0341 0.0388 
 (0.0155)*** (0.0157)*** (0.0095)*** (0.0121)*** 
usmc -0.0068 0.0020 0.0004 -0.0224 
 (0.0300) (0.0294) (0.0110) (0.0214) 
usaf 0.0155 0.0417 0.0104 -0.0492 
 (0.0148) (0.0144)*** (0.0094) (0.0104)*** 
vetrn -0.0520 -0.0475 -0.0248 -0.0249 
 (0.0109)*** (0.0107)*** (0.0041)*** (0.0080)*** 
lmktexp -0.0145 -0.0133 0.0024 -0.0192 
 (0.0016)*** (0.0016)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0013)*** 
lmktexpsq 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0000 0.0004 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0000) (0.0000)*** 
totfedyrs -0.0418 -0.0344 0.0032 -0.0300 
 (0.0043)*** (0.0037)*** (0.0010)*** (0.0030)*** 
totfedysq 0.0011 0.0010 0.0000 0.0006 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0000)* (0.0001)*** 
avgperf  0.1079 0.0095 0.0490 
  (0.0080)*** (0.0043)** (0.0065)*** 
grade   0.1144  
   (0.0009)***  
grade0    0.0803 
    (0.0013)*** 
Constant 11.5104 10.9116 9.5054 10.5978 
 (0.0640)*** (0.0532)*** (0.0253)*** (0.0511)*** 
Observations 22,852 18,504 18,504 18,488 
Censored obs. 12,762 8,468 8,468 8,459 
λ  -0.4479 -0.4324 0.0068 -0.3184 
se(λ ) 0.0360 0.0335 0.0019 0.0395 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




salaries, even when controlling for performance (Column 2).  
Minorities also earn less, compared to whites, suggesting 
potential evidence of gender and race discrimination.  As 
expected, education plays a significant effect on annual 
salaries as advanced degree holders display positive and 
statistically significant coefficients.  All agencies show 
insignificant partial effects on salary, except for Navy 
employees, who earn close to 6% higher salaries.  Veterans 
earn 5% less than non-veterans.  It seems that prior 
experience, either in the labor market or federal service, 
plays no role in DoD salary expectations, as evidenced in 
the negative partial effects for experience and tenure 
variables.  This can be due to the uniqueness of the 
specific training characteristics of DoD occupations.  As 
expected, performance has a positive effect on yearly 
compensation and controls for about 11% of salaries. 
When controlling for grade (Column 3), migrants seem 
to earn slightly less than non-migrants.  The difference, 
while statistically significant, is so minute that there is 
no practical difference (migrants earn 0.6% less).  While 
females continue to earn less than males, the difference is 
smaller, with women earning around 3% less.  Within grade, 
no evidence of race discrimination occurs, with all race 
variables displaying positive partial effects.  Education 
variables show no change in direction, but do so in 
magnitude.  As expected, they are now smaller since we are 
observing individuals within grade.   
The female-migration interaction term shows 
interesting results across all columns when corrected for 
selection.  By definition, female tied-movers migrate to 
increase household income utility, not necessarily their 
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own wages.  In the prior regressions in Table 6, the 
negative coefficients on femmig suggest evidence of females 
acting as tied-movers.  When controlling for selection 
(Table 8), the coefficients become positive (except within 
grade), suggesting that women who are tied-movers have left 
the sample.  Assuming we see everyone in the sample, the 
Heckman corrected results on femmig show a positive return 
with women also searching for personal utility 
maximization.  Within grade (Column 3), however, females 
that move must do so for reasons other than increases in 
salary.    
Throughout the first three selection-corrected 
regressions, the returns to education on salaries are 
positive and proportional to the degree attained.   When 
controlling for initial grade (Column 4), interestingly, 
Baccalaureates and PhD’s earn similar returns (12%), both 
higher than the salary returns for a Master’s degree (8%).  
An explanation could be an underutilization of PhD’s or 
diversification of positions occupied by Baccalaureates.  
Overall, the effects of migration are consistently 
positive but smaller in magnitude than the prior 
uncorrected results, still suggesting migration is a 
strategic move for workers to advance.  Females still earn 
lower salaries than men, and veterans’ results remain 
practically unchanged, still showing veterans earning less 
than non-veterans.  We now turn our attention to the 
Promotion Model. 
Table 9 displays the selection-adjusted estimates on 
the Promotion Model.  Migrant employees throughout all 
regressions continue to have a higher probability of 
promotion compared to non-migrants; however, the magnitude 
Table 9. Selection Adjusted Estimates of the Effect of 
Migration on the Probability of Promotion 
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Dependent Variable: promote 
















evermig 0.1098 0.0298 0.1084 0.0295 0.0700 0.0203 0.1147 0.0349 
 (0.0387)***  (0.0386)***  (0.0370)*  (0.0375)***  
female 0.2322 0.0611 0.2383 0.0632 0.2488 0.0711 0.1529 0.0455 
 (0.0388)***  (0.0386)***  (0.0422)***  (0.0383)***  
femmig 0.8498 0.2935 0.8579 0.2976 0.8057 0.2876 0.8280 0.3020 
 (0.1100)***  (0.1122)***  (0.1100)***  (0.1109)***  
black 0.0017 0.0004 0.0095 0.0025 0.0199 0.0057 -0.0323 -0.0095 
 (0.0461)  (0.0459)  (0.0464)  (0.0446)  
hisp -0.0289 -0.0075 -0.0341 -0.0089 -0.0254 -0.0072 -0.0783 -0.0226 
 (0.0749)  (0.0747)  (0.0745)  (0.0727)  
othrace -0.0305 -0.0079 -0.0258 -0.0068 -0.0208 -0.0059 -0.0792 -0.0229 
 (0.0652)  (0.0647)  (0.0656)  (0.0627)  
bach0 -0.1859 -0.0465 -0.1829 -0.0461 -0.1932 -0.0526 -0.0788 -0.0230 
 (0.0434)***  (0.0429)***  (0.0553)***  (0.0430)*  
mastr0 -0.2811 -0.0659 -0.2788 -0.0660 -0.2792 -0.0718 -0.0883 -0.0255 
 (0.0667)***  (0.0661)***  (0.0828)***  (0.0673)  
phd0 -0.5677 -0.1124 -0.5418 -0.1098 -0.5192 -0.1170 -0.1808 -0.0500 
 (0.1995)***  (0.1983)***  (0.2175)**  (0.1939)  
army -0.0491 -0.0129 -0.1105 -0.0290 -0.1076 -0.0304 -0.1027 -0.0303 
 (0.0505)  (0.0550)**  (0.0520)**  (0.0529)*  
navy -0.1858 -0.0462 -0.1731 -0.0435 -0.1700 -0.0463 -0.1322 -0.0380 
 (0.0602)***  (0.0602)***  (0.0607)***  (0.0585)**  
usmc -0.0146 -0.0038 -0.0136 -0.0036 -0.0227 -0.0064 0.0063 0.0019 
 (0.1271)  (0.1263)  (0.1228)  (0.1227)  
usaf -0.1897 -0.0476 -0.1808 -0.0459 -0.1768 -0.0485 -0.1058 -0.0307 
 (0.0558)***  (0.0551)***  (0.0542)***  (0.0538)**  
vetrn 0.0504 0.0134 0.0440 0.0118 0.0288 0.0082 0.0253 0.0076 
 (0.0448)  (0.0449)  (0.0441)  (0.0438)  
lmktexp -0.0205 -0.0054 -0.0213 -0.0056 -0.0195 -0.0056 -0.0189 -0.0056 
 (0.0064)***  (0.0064)***  (0.0064)***  (0.0061)***  
lmktexpsq 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
 (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  
totfedyrs 0.0069 0.0018 0.0108 0.0029 0.0077 0.0022 -0.0012 -0.0004 
 (0.0175)  (0.0175)  (0.0181)  (0.0169)  
totfedysq -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0001 
 (0.0005)*  (0.0005)*  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  
avgperf   0.0856 0.0227 0.0866 0.0247 0.1232 0.0366 
   (0.0325)***  (0.0338)**  (0.0315)***  
grade     0.0061 0.0017   
     (0.0160)    
grade0       -0.0579 -0.0172 
       (0.0064)***  
Constant -0.6018  -0.9732  -0.9402  -0.5840  
 (0.2516)**  (0.2784)***  (0.3613)***  (0.2722)**  
Observations 22,695  18,364  18,364  18,348  
Censored 
obs. 12,762.00  8,468.00  8,468.00  8,459.00  
P(ŷ=1|s=1)  0.1112  0.1119  0.1031  0.1121 ρ  -0.33  -0.39  -0.52  -0.52  
LR test of 
indep. eqns. 














likelihood -17,960.09  -15,370.06  -14,540.98  -15,305.59  
Log 
likelihood 
cens. -17,964.09  -15,373.41  -14,547.05  -15,311.79  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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is smaller than previously reported.  When controlling for 
selection, the return to migration has a partial effect of 
approximately 0.03.  Females now show positive and 
significant partial effects in all regressions, suggesting 
that women promote at a faster rate than men.  Of most 
significance, female migrants (femmig) display the highest 
increase in probability of promotion, from negative 
coefficients in Table 9, to an almost 0.30 higher 
probability of getting promoted over males.  This result 
confirms the studies by Mehay and Pema (2004) asserting 
that females are better performers and are more likely to 
be promoted.  Race variables show statistically 
insignificant coefficients, disproving prior claims of 
potential race discrimination.  The returns to education in 
terms of promotion opportunities are negative for all 
degree holders in the baseline regression (Column 1) and 
when controlling for performance (Column 2) and grade 
(Column 3).  When controlling for initial grade (Column 4), 
the returns are no different than zero.  It seems that 
education plays a large role in determining initial 
salaries and higher starting positions; however, in itself 
education is no guarantee for promotion.  Performance, as 
expected, has a positive effect on promotion.  Veterans 
show no significant advantages in promotion compared to 
non-veterans, and prior labor market and federal experience 
do not increase the probability of promotion either.  It 
appears that in the DoD employee promotion opportunities 
are not based on any sort of prior labor market, federal or 
military experience, ceteris paribus. 
Overall, the selection-corrected estimates changed the 
magnitude of the effects of migration on salaries and 
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promotion.  The direction of those effects remained the 
same.  The results also suggest that although minorities 
are paid less, they have the same opportunities for 
promotion than whites.  Like minorities, females are also 
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V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this study was to examine the returns 
to migration in terms of salary and promotion expectations 
for civilian DoD employees who were hired in 1994 and 1995 
and who stayed in civil service until 2003.  Specifically, 
the following questions were explored: 
 
• Is mobility within the DoD internal labor market 
associated with higher promotions or salary returns? 
• Would males and females behave differently in terms 
of promotion opportunities? 
• Since veterans may have superior information and 
lower psychic costs, are they benefiting from higher 
returns to mobility? 
 
The data used in our study were provided by the 
Defense Manpower Data Center and were drawn from the 
Department of Defense Civilian Personnel Data Files.  The 
dataset included two cohorts of personnel whose careers 
were followed from 1994-1995 until 2003.  The final dataset 
consisted of 21,143 General Schedule employees between the 
ages of 21 and 61 at the time of entry.  A total of 3,267 
personnel (15.4% of the sample) were interstate migrants.   
The data were set up as an unbalanced panel with a total of 
132,068 observations. 
For our study, migration was defined as individuals 
changing duty location from one state to another in a given 
year.  Promotion was defined as a change in grade from one 
year to another.  Two empirical models were developed, one 
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for estimating salary determinants and one for promotion 
factors.  The Salary Model was estimated using Ordinary 
Least Squares regression, while the Promotion Model was 
calculated using probit estimates.  Both models were 
corrected for selection bias using Heckman techniques.  The 
two models included demographic, education and experience 
characteristics.  In the selection-corrected estimates, 
alternate job opportunities were proxied by occupational 
dummies while labor market conditions were proxied with 
state dummy variables.  Table 10 provides an overview of 
the Salary Model results for the coefficients of interest.  
 
Table 10. Summary of Statistically Significant Partial 
Effects of Interest: Salary Model 
 
Dependent Variable: lyrcomp 
Method (1) OLS (2) OLS  (3) OLS (4) OLS  
migrate 0.0934 0.0886 -0.0114 0.0494 
female -0.1888 -0.2012 -0.0143 -0.0492 
femmig -0.0293 - - - 
vetrn -0.0427 -0.0377 -0.0281 -0.0235 
Heckman Corrected Estimates: 
Method (1) MLE (2) MLE (3) MLE (4) MLE 
evermig 0.0577 0.0647 -0.0060 0.0551 
female -0.1561 -0.1645 -0.0289 -0.0422 
femmig - - -0.0248 0.0383 
vetrn -0.0520 -0.0475 -0.0248 -0.0249 
Additional Controls - perf grade grade0 
 
The results of the estimations show a positive effect 
of migration on the log of yearly compensation.  Initially, 
migrant workers earned around 9% higher salaries than non-
migrants, and when comparing individuals who started in the 
same grade (Column 4), the migrants observe an estimated 5% 
higher salaries than non-mobile employees.  In the Heckman 
estimates, the partial effect of migration remains higher 
for migrants, fluctuating between 5% and 6%.  Within grade 
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(Column 3), the effects are negative because salaries are 
determined to a large extent by grade level.   
At first, the negative partial effect on femmig 
appears to suggest evidence of women acting as tied-movers; 
however, the coefficients become insignificant nullifying 
the tied-mover effect.  The selection-corrected 
coefficients shift to become positive, implying tied-movers 
have left the sample.  Despite the shift, and lack of 
evidence of tied-moves, females consistently earn less, 
even in the selection corrected models, indicating a 
potential occurrence of gender discrimination.          
Throughout all regression veterans consistently earned 
less than non-veterans.  This could be because veterans may 
be averse to moving as they likely have experienced many 
moves in their active duty military career.  Alternatively, 
their possession of superior information regarding the DoD 
may place them in primary locations where the opportunity 
cost of migration is higher than the utility they receive 
from their current duty location.     
The Promotion Model also displays favorable results 
toward migrants.  In all regressions, migrants show higher 
promotion rates than non-migrants.  The selection-corrected 
model levels the probability of promotion for mobile 
workers at around 0.03 higher than non-migrant employees.  
A review of the Promotion Model results is presented in 
Table 11.   
At first, females seem to promote slower than men, 
with some insignificant coefficients.  With the Heckman 
correction; however, women promote faster than men.  Most 
markedly, female migrants have especially high promotion 
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rates, suggesting that females are more mobile and more 
likely to get promoted than males.  Veterans and non-
veterans behave no different from each other when it comes 
to promotion opportunities.  Because of the statistically 
insignificant results, it appears neither group has an 
advantage over the other.  
 
Table 11. Summary of Statistically Significant Partial 
Effects of Interest: Promotion Model 
 
Dependent Variable: promote 
Method (1) Probit (2) Probit (3) Probit (4) Probit 
migrate 0.2127 0.2085 0.1887 0.2260 
female - - 0.0286 -0.0265 
femmig -0.0192 - - - 
vetrn 0.0076 0.0078 0.0090 0.0055 
Heckman Corrected Estimates: 
Method (1) MLE (2) MLE (3) MLE (4) MLE 
evermig 0.0298 0.0295 0.0203 0.0349 
female 0.0611 0.0632 0.0711 0.0455 
femmig 0.2935 0.2976 0.2876 0.3020 
vetrn - - - - 
Additional controls - perf grade grade0 
 
The predicted probabilities of staying in the sample 
and getting promoted are presented in Table 12 and were 
calculated from the selection-corrected promotion 
estimates:  
 
Table 12. Predicted Probabilities of Staying in Sample and 
Experiencing Promotion 
 
Predicted Probability of Staying and Promoting: 





















Percent Change for 
Migrants +50.4% +44.1% +61.0% +44.1% 
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The table shows that, on average, when workers are 
predicted to remain in the sample and migrate, their 
probability of promotion is at least 44% higher.  Within 
grade, the predicted probability is highest, with migrant 
workers having a 61% higher probability of promotion. 
Discussing other covariates, prior labor market and 
prior federal experience have minimal to no effect on 
salaries or the probability of promotion.  As expected, 
education has a positive effect on salaries and it appears 
that education plays a large role in determining initial 
salaries and higher positions, but education itself is not 
a guarantee for promotion.  Although the results suggest 
minorities are paid less, they experience the same 
opportunities for promotion as whites. 
Within the Department of Defense civilian internal 
labor market, the greatest opportunities for promotion 
arise with mobility.  Migration seems to be a strategic 
move for workers to advance and maximize their personal 
utility since migrants earn higher salaries than non-
migrants.  Migrants are also more likely to be promoted 
than stationary workers.  Females present no evidence of 
tied-mover effects, and pursue promotion and salary 
opportunities like males.  Women promote faster than men, 
and women who migrate increase their chances of promotion 
even more.  Females, however, earn lower salaries than 
males.  Veterans earn lower salaries than non-veterans, and 
have no significant advantages in promotion over their 
counterparts, disproving our premise that veterans may 
benefit from superior information on the Department of 




Further studies can be conducted regarding DoD 
internal migration.  One possible research path could look 
at migration, not within states, but across counties or 
cities.  This way, we could capture a larger sample of 
migrants.  Another could be to focus on specific large 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas, like the District of 
Columbia (DC).  The DC Metropolitan Statistical Area 
encompasses three states, thus interstate migration may 
occur within the local area.  Another area of interest is 
exploring the connection between over-education and 
internal migration.  The labor literature suggests that 
workers with more education than the minimum requirements 
for the job are likely to be maxed out within their 
specific job categories; therefore, their only opportunity 
for advancement is to change positions within the same 
firm.  Some of this mobility could be across states or 
cities.  Finally, analytical techniques like survival 
analysis may be applied to the dataset to understand when 
people leave the sample, and thus narrow the reasons for 




Table A. First Stage Retention Probit Estimates: Salary 
Model 
 
Dependent Variable: stay 
 From Model  
(1) Table 8 
From Model  
(2) Table 8 
From Model  
(3) Table 8 
From Model  
(4) Table 8 
female -0.0575 -0.0577 0.0607 -0.0456 
 (0.0190)*** (0.0208)*** (0.0243)** (0.0218)** 
black -0.0602 -0.0619 0.1364 -0.0413 
 (0.0236)** (0.0258)** (0.0286)*** (0.0259) 
hisp 0.1049 0.1185 0.1829 0.0943 
 (0.0389)*** (0.0431)*** (0.0464)*** (0.0426)** 
othrace 0.1549 0.1248 0.2462 0.1065 
 (0.0345)*** (0.0375)*** (0.0419)*** (0.0379)*** 
bach0 -0.0563 -0.0921 -0.2432 -0.0314 
 (0.0213)*** (0.0234)*** (0.0274)*** (0.0241) 
mastr0 -0.0599 -0.0866 -0.3268 -0.0043 
 (0.0311)* (0.0337)** (0.0401)*** (0.0349) 
phd0 -0.2623 -0.3228 -0.7110 -0.1384 
 (0.0688)*** (0.0732)*** (0.0819)*** (0.0738)* 
army 0.1873 0.2274 0.1456 0.2656 
 (0.0300)*** (0.0352)*** (0.0356)*** (0.0362)*** 
navy 0.0452 0.0214 0.0204 0.0737 
 (0.0331) (0.0370) (0.0380) (0.0375)** 
usmc 0.0730 0.0760 0.0761 0.1025 
 (0.0654) (0.0710) (0.0752) (0.0714) 
usaf 0.2354 0.1670 -0.0757 0.1863 
 (0.0320)*** (0.0357)*** (0.0362)** (0.0362)*** 
vetrn 0.1285 0.1171 0.0845 0.1205 
 (0.0220)*** (0.0240)*** (0.0266)*** (0.0240)*** 
lmktexp 0.0345 0.0319 0.0333 0.0317 
 (0.0029)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0035)*** (0.0033)*** 
lmktexpsq -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 
totfedyrs 0.1027 0.0806 0.0850 0.0746 
 (0.0065)*** (0.0069)*** (0.0072)*** (0.0070)*** 
totfedysq -0.0023 -0.0019 -0.0022 -0.0018 
 (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** 
avgperf - -0.0954 -0.1708 -0.0886 
  (0.0162)*** (0.0170)*** (0.0165)*** 
grade - - 0.1643 - 
   (0.0044)***  
grade0 - - - -0.0061 
    (0.0038) 
biosci -0.2511 -0.3011 -0.1678 -0.3408 
 (0.0510)*** (0.0560)*** (0.0917)* (0.0648)*** 
physci -0.3200 -0.3252 -0.4391 -0.4837 
 (0.0462)*** (0.0499)*** (0.0659)*** (0.0536)*** 
engineer 0.0292 -0.0389 -0.1365 0.0583 
 (0.0263) (0.0259) (0.0400)*** (0.0307)* 
medical -0.3647 -0.3231 -0.1809 -0.5136 
 (0.0330)*** (0.0346)*** (0.0357)*** (0.0379)*** 
design -0.2401 -0.2792 -0.0136 -0.3092 
 (0.0460)*** (0.0497)*** (0.0849) (0.0569)*** 
legal 0.3038 0.2462 0.0070 -0.1261 
 (0.0486)*** (0.0495)*** (0.0717) (0.0415)*** 
educator -0.2313 -0.2833 -0.0569 -0.2932 
48 
 (0.0278)*** (0.0308)*** (0.0509) (0.0318)*** 
library -0.5918 -0.6015 0.0179 -0.5975 
 (0.0902)*** (0.0998)*** (0.1402) (0.0904)*** 
logitmgt -0.0770 -0.1369 -0.1018 -0.0933 
 (0.0255)*** (0.0259)*** (0.0413)** (0.0296)*** 
personnel -0.1861 -0.2030 -0.0478 -0.1688 
 (0.0310)*** (0.0350)*** (0.0509) (0.0345)*** 
datasys -1.5416 -1.5616 -2.1639 -1.5532 
 (0.1509)*** (0.1624)*** (0.1407)*** (0.1823)*** 
centmgt -0.2994 -0.3675 -0.0767 -0.4341 
 (0.0525)*** (0.0571)*** (0.0901) (0.0582)*** 
logitech -0.4090 -0.4242 -0.1486 -0.4239 
 (0.0350)*** (0.0404)*** (0.0442)*** (0.0411)*** 
mgtech -0.7042 -0.7228 0.1390 -0.6178 
 (0.0278)*** (0.0317)*** (0.0461)*** (0.0311)*** 
clerk -0.4219 -0.4612 0.1426 -0.3973 
 (0.0223)*** (0.0260)*** (0.0306)*** (0.0243)*** 
polfire -0.4328 -0.4482 0.0792 -0.3479 
 (0.0412)*** (0.0444)*** (0.0459)* (0.0485)*** 
socsci -0.4053 -0.4279 -0.3313 -0.5440 
 (0.0388)*** (0.0415)*** (0.0586)*** (0.0480)*** 
state dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant -0.8999 -0.0204 -1.2764 -0.0036 
 (0.0727)*** (0.1015) (0.1252)*** (0.1032) 
Observations 22,852 18,504 18,504 18,488 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table B. First Stage Retention Probit Estimates: Promotion 
Model 
 
Dependent Variable: stay 
 From Model (1) 
Table 9 
From Model (2) 
Table 9 
From Model (3) 
Table 9 
From Model (4) 
Table 9 
female -0.1008 -0.1307 0.0579 -0.0933 
 (0.0208)*** (0.0232)*** (0.0244)** (0.0238)*** 
black -0.0320 -0.0361 0.1325 -0.0129 
 (0.0248) (0.0274) (0.0285)*** (0.0277) 
hisp 0.0741 0.0823 0.1741 0.0952 
 (0.0410)* (0.0457)* (0.0470)*** (0.0458)** 
othrace 0.1865 0.1571 0.2426 0.1706 
 (0.0364)*** (0.0401)*** (0.0411)*** (0.0401)*** 
bach0 0.0648 0.0687 -0.2433 0.0280 
 (0.0232)*** (0.0258)*** (0.0278)*** (0.0265) 
mastr0 0.0848 0.1026 -0.3250 0.0267 
 (0.0344)** (0.0382)*** (0.0405)*** (0.0398) 
phd0 -0.0772 -0.1069 -0.6974 -0.2285 
 (0.0734) (0.0799) (0.0821)*** (0.0818)*** 
army 0.1879 0.2546 0.1627 0.2464 
 (0.0296)*** (0.0340)*** (0.0350)*** (0.0341)*** 
navy 0.1044 0.1186 0.0324 0.1113 
 (0.0333)*** (0.0368)*** (0.0380) (0.0368)*** 
usmc 0.0943 0.1475 0.0807 0.1373 
 (0.0681) (0.0757)* (0.0784) (0.0758)* 
usaf 0.2049 0.1773 -0.0617 0.1431 
 (0.0314)*** (0.0346)*** (0.0361)* (0.0352)*** 
vetrn 0.1156 0.0944 0.0804 0.0948 
 (0.0232)*** (0.0257)*** (0.0264)*** (0.0258)*** 
lmktexp 0.0337 0.0304 0.0338 0.0281 
 (0.0030)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0035)*** (0.0034)*** 
lmktexpsq -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0007 
 (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 
totfedyrs 0.1182 0.0893 0.0945 0.0885 
 (0.0065)*** (0.0070)*** (0.0072)*** (0.0070)*** 
totfedysq -0.0026 -0.0021 -0.0024 -0.0022 
 (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** 
avgperf - -0.0932 -0.1703 -0.1051 
  (0.0160)*** (0.0166)*** (0.0161)*** 
grade - - 0.1650 - 
   (0.0042)***  
grade0 - - - 0.0262 
    (0.0041)*** 
biosci -0.0810 -0.1533 -0.1590 -0.1559 
 (0.0809) (0.0885)* (0.0894)* (0.0874)* 
physci -0.4431 -0.4421 -0.4268 -0.4432 
 (0.0608)*** (0.0680)*** (0.0703)*** (0.0679)*** 
engineer 0.1246 0.0063 -0.1436 -0.0099 
 (0.0363)*** (0.0396) (0.0403)*** (0.0391) 
medical -0.4212 -0.3571 -0.2013 -0.3729 
 (0.0308)*** (0.0345)*** (0.0350)*** (0.0337)*** 
design -0.0149 -0.0248 -0.0133 -0.0250 
 (0.0761) (0.0839) (0.0855) (0.0829) 
legal 0.1784 0.0754 -0.0490 0.0296 
 (0.0653)*** (0.0703) (0.0715) (0.0694) 
educator -0.0325 -0.1147 -0.0954 -0.1306 
 (0.0461) (0.0511)** (0.0518)* (0.0504)*** 
library -0.3363 -0.3469 0.0004 -0.3130 
 (0.1241)*** (0.1355)** (0.1386) (0.1342)** 
logitmgt 0.0867 0.0097 -0.0884 0.0094 
 (0.0372)** (0.0404) (0.0417)** (0.0399) 
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personnel -0.0749 -0.0732 -0.0541 -0.0635 
 (0.0456) (0.0501) (0.0509) (0.0494) 
datasys -1.9694 -2.0663 -2.1599 -2.0960 
 (0.1242)*** (0.1308)*** (0.1295)*** (0.1304)*** 
centmgt -0.0856 -0.1729 -0.1175 -0.1790 
 (0.0812) (0.0875)** (0.0888) (0.0867)** 
logitech -0.3421 -0.3727 -0.1567 -0.3625 
 (0.0371)*** (0.0406)*** (0.0420)*** (0.0404)*** 
mgtech -0.3753 -0.3102 0.1488 -0.2742 
 (0.0385)*** (0.0437)*** (0.0459)*** (0.0438)*** 
clerk -0.1643 -0.1661 0.1464 -0.1401 
 (0.0258)*** (0.0284)*** (0.0301)*** (0.0285)*** 
polfire -0.2174 -0.2098 0.1211 -0.1718 
 (0.0397)*** (0.0452)*** (0.0465)*** (0.0446)*** 
socsci -0.3814 -0.3992 -0.3526 -0.4115 
 (0.0508)*** (0.0563)*** (0.0569)*** (0.0558)*** 
state dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant -1.0607 -0.1642 -1.4129 -0.2650 
 (0.0901)*** (0.1178) (0.1253)*** (0.1184)** 
Observations 22,695 18,364 18,364 18,348 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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